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NOT ENOUGH BLAME TO GO AROUND:
REFLECTIONS ON REQUIRING PURPOSEFUL
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT*

Susan Bandest
How should we think about blame and responsibility
when a governmental entity, rather than an individual, is
accused of wrongdoing? Neither blame nor responsibility is a
term capable of precise definition. Blame, however, is a concept
with particular resonances. I suggest that a tendency to
premise government liability on blame rather than
responsibility has become increasingly pronounced, and that it
is worth noticing both for its consequences and for the
particular emotional variables it injects into the question of
government accountability.
To place the workings of blame and responsibility in a
concrete context, let me briefly describe one particular
situation with which I am quite familiar. It involves, as is so
often the case with governmental wrongdoing, a complex series
of interlocking actions and inactions by a variety of actors. As I
summarize the situation, think about the concepts of
,responsibility" and "blame" and where they might attach.
I.

WHO'S TO BLAME FOR POLICE TORTURE?

During a period of at least thirteen years beginning in
the early 1970s, more than sixty men, all of them AfricanAmerican, alleged that they had been tortured by several
named police officers in the Area Two Violent Crimes Unit on
Chicago's South Side.' Complaints were filed with the
©2003 Susan Bandes. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, DePaul University. I wish to thank Lawrence Solan and
Brooklyn Law School for organizing the superb conference, "Responsibility & Blame:
Psychological and Legal Perspectives," at which this Article was presented.
1 The following account is taken from Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice:
1195
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applicable administrative agencies, the mayor, the state's
attorney and the United States Attorney, and allegations were
raised in numerous judicial proceedings. These complaints and
allegations came from numerous unconnected sources; were
corroborated by, among others, hospital personnel and defense
attorneys; described alarmingly similar acts of torture; and
named the same police officers over and over. The response,
until 1990, was one of inaction and denial. The internal police
agency charged with investigating such allegations, the Office
of Professional Standards, tended to treat each allegation as
sui generis, and dismiss it for lack of credibility. It did not
conduct an investigation of the alleged pattern of torture until
1990, and when it did, the city suppressed its report finding
systematic torture for two years. The Area Two unit
commander and ringleader, John Burge, was not fired until
1993. The other officers involved have been subjected to no
discipline, and many have been promoted, commended and
allowed to retire with full benefits. Ten men who allege their
confessions were the product of torture in Area Two spent
years on death row. In January 2003, Governor George Ryan
pardoned four men who had spent a total of sixty years on
death row, finding that they had confessed to crimes that they
did not commit after being tortured.'
Inaction was the prominent behavior that permitted the
torture ring to continue for so long. Supervisors at Area Two
looked the other way and failed to supervise, as did Illinois
Assistant Attorneys General who took statements from the
torture victims and as did doctors and other personnel at Cook
County Hospital, where the men were sometimes brought for
treatment. Police departments failed to accept complaints, the
State's Attorney and United States Attorney failed to
investigate, several successive chiefs of police and at least one
mayor of Chicago' ignored complaints, and a series of state and

Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1276-78, 1288-1305 (1999). See
the article and sources cited therein for a fuller account of the Area Two scandal.
2 Steve Mills & Christi Parsons, "The System has Failed": Ryan Condemns
Injustice, Pardons 6 and Paves the Way for Sweeping Clemency, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11,
2003, at 1. The remaining men who had alleged their confessions were the product of
torture were part of the group who had their sentences commuted to life without
parole. See Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Decision Day for 156 Inmates, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 12, 2003, at 1.
For an account of the current Mayor Daley's role in the widespread
governmental failure to act, see Bandes, supra note 1, at 1302.
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federal judges failed to suppress confessions or to allow inquiry
into the possibility of a pattern.
The scandal I've described crosses all sorts of
jurisdictional boundaries-a dizzying array of governmental
agencies let down the Area Two torture victims. This fact alone
makes it difficult to affix responsibility in legally manageable
ways. We might have a wide-ranging discussion about moral
blame, but legal responsibility requires a legally cognizable
actor: either an individual or an entity. As to individual legal
responsibility, the question seems relatively straightforward.
Several police officers, clothed with the authority of law, spent
at least thirteen years torturing suspects, and then
consistently lied about doing so on the witness stand and
elsewhere. Thus, as to the street-level officers and even some
supervisory personnel there are no really hard lines to draw
between action and inaction; negligence, intent and
malevolence; responsibility and blame; or even legal and moral
blame. Commander Burge and his men satisfy the conventional
story of evil men bent on evil acts. If they had been disciplined,
fired or even criminally prosecuted for their individual acts, we
might say that the most blameworthy actors had received their
just punishment, but this would be shortsighted. The role of
the government entities raises all the most difficult issues,
given that the entities have yet to address the systemic
problems that allowed the scandal to continue unchecked for so
long. How do notions of blame and responsibility help-or
hinder-the inquiry into how to deal with the applicable
entities?
The question of how to measure and enforce the
accountability of entities, governmental or private, has always
been complicated by the abstract nature of the wrongdoer.
There is an initial hurdle: how to think about the entity's
capacity for acting wrongly. The law often approaches this
question by considering whether the corporation, municipality
or agency should be considered a person within the reach of
some common law or statutory scheme.4 But even once the
entity is recast as a person for this purpose, there remains the
4 See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS

ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 83-93 (2000) (discussing legal approaches to corporate
liability, including jury instructions informing that "[a]ll persons are equal before the
law, and corporations, big or small, are entitled to the same fair consideration that you
would give any other individual party"). See also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that a state and instrumentalities of a state are not persons
subject to suit under Section 1983).
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practical difficulty of determining when this constructive
person has acted. For reasons I explore below, courts have
difficulty answering this question without analogizing an
entity to an actual person. At times, the law looks to the
question of which actual persons have acted for or as the
entity. Alternatively, it may attempt to understand or evaluate
an entity's behavior using human behavior as a yardstick or
analogue.6 It is not surprising, and not necessarily problematic,
that abstract entities are so insistently anthropomorphized.
The explanations for the drive to transform an abstract notion
into something human and manageable can be understood
through multiple lenses: narrative, linguistic, psychological
and philosophical, among others. The tendency to humanize
becomes problematic when the reasons for the transformation
are forgotten or papered over; when heuristic goals are
confused with descriptive accuracy. It becomes a problem
when, for example, a municipality is confused with an actual
person who ought not to be held responsible unless his actions
are blameworthy.
It is neither coherent nor helpful to talk about
government responsibility in the abstract. The responsibilities
of government entities, like their very existence, derive from a
complex web of regulatory schemata. In order to think about
blame and responsibility and how they work when government
is the wrongdoer, I want to focus in particular on the major
source of municipal liability: Section 1983.' The development of
decisional law interpreting this statute will illustrate my
concern about the shift from responsibility to blame.
When the Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of
Social Services of New York 8 overruled Monroe v. Pape' to hold
that municipalities are persons within the meaning of Section
1983, it transformed a marginally useful statute into a
potentially powerful force for governmental accountability. At
the same time, Monell began a quarter century (and counting)

' See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
6 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown (Bryan County), 520 U.S.
397
(1997) (discussed infra note 10 and accompanying text). See also HANS, supra note 4, at
83 (noting that "elements of the personhood conception continue to play a significant
role in shaping legal treatment of the corporation").
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
8 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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of torturous grappling with when, exactly, a municipality had
acted, and could therefore be held accountable.
How should the Court determine when a municipality
has subjected someone to a deprivation of rights? There are a
variety of defensible directions the Court could have taken in
interpreting the reach of municipal liability, and a variety of
defensible tools it could have used to determine which direction
was best. My particular focus is on how the debate over the
proper scope of the doctrine has been influenced by the
seductive pull of the notion of blame.

II.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: THE OFFICIAL STORY

The Supreme Court consistently portrays itself as faced
with a conundrum: The municipality is an aggregation of
persons, it can act only through those persons, yet the
municipal entity must be distinguished from its agents for
purposes of the statute." The perceived statutory mandate to
distinguish municipality from agents is the driving force
behind the Court's municipal liability jurisprudence. This
perceived conundrum is, in complex ways, both the source and
the result of the troubled state of current municipal liability
jurisprudence. It rests on the mistaken notion that the
municipality can in fact be distinguished from its agents.
Municipal liability, as Larry Kramer and Alan Sykes
persuasively argued, "is necessarily vicarious."'" Municipal
actions are always carried out by agents. Any means of
distinguishing the municipality from those agents will be
prescriptive rather than descriptive. The Court's efforts to
resolve the perceived conundrum have driven many of its
crucial interpretive choices about the scope of municipal
liability, yet the prescriptive nature of those choices is rarely
acknowledged. Indeed, the conundrum itself is largely the
result of the Court's own doctrinal choices. For example, it
would disappear if the Court adopted respondeat superior
liability, rendering the municipality liable for its agents' acts.
The drive to distinguish the municipality from its
agents also has a deeper source: the need to render an abstract
'0 See, e.g., Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 410; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 391-92 (1989). See also Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law,
91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 337 (1992).

11Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal

and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 253.
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entity understandable-not just legally, but cognitively. How
are we to think about wrongdoing in relation to a bureaucracy,
a complex regulatory creation with "no soul to be damned, and
no body to be kicked?"" We tend to try to grasp the concept
either by focusing on particular individual actors of the entity,
or by humanizing, anthropomorphizing the entity itself." At
times courts attempt to identify the particular employees who
act on behalf of the municipality, thus transforming an
abstract sovereign into a more familiar aggregation of human
actors, with familiar human attributes. To the extent there is
room for the notion of the municipality itself as wrongdoer, the
measures of its wrongdoing often take human form-it is cast
as an actor with motives, emotions and volition. These may be
useful devices in their place, but the question then becomes:
What is that place? The Court all too often seems to forget why
it resorts to these devices, and its lack of clarity has
consequences.
The starting point in defining municipal liability must
be the statute itself. One of the challenges of interpreting
Section 1983 is that the language of the statute is famously
spare and unhelpful, and the relevant legislative history
virtually non-existent. The language of the statute imposes
liability on any "person" who, under color of state law, "subjects
or causes to be subjected" a person within United States
jurisdiction to a deprivation of federal rights. 4 How does a
municipality subject or cause to be subjected? Although the
Monell Court purported to rely heavily on Section 1983's literal
language,1 this language affords little in the way of direction or
limitation. As Justice Breyer argued most recently in his
dissent in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County,
Oklahoma v. Brown," "as a purely linguistic matter," the
municipality could be said to subject someone to a deprivation,
or cause someone to be so subjected, any time one of its
employees acts within the scope of his or her employment. 7 The
12

William S. Laufer, Integrity, Diligence, and the Limits of Good Corporate

Citizenship, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 157, 158 (1996) (quoting Baron Thurlow).
13 See HANS, supra note 4, at 84-91 (noting that jurors in trials with corporate
defendants tend to focus on specific individuals, or to search for analogies enabling
them to reduce the corporation to an individual template).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
15 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). See also Bryan
County, 520 U.S. at 430 (Souter, J., dissenting).
16 Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 430 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 431.
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language itself would not preclude liability even under the
purest respondeat superior scenario, the scenario that
Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 8 for example, found most objectionable: in
which the municipality had no prior notice that the officer
would engage in excessive force; the officer only did so on one
occasion; and the municipality took all appropriate steps after
the wrongful act occurred.
The irony of the Court's claim of reliance on statutory
language is quickly made plain. To ward off the possibility of
collapsing the distinction between entity and employee, the
Monell Court created a requirement found nowhere in the
language of the statute: the requirement that liability attach
only to acts taken pursuant to official policy. 9 In support of this
requirement, the Court relied on a legislative history whose
tenuous nature is well documented."0 As the Monell Court
readily conceded, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts
contains "virtually no discussion of"1 Section 1983.22 Section
1983's engagement with legislative history generally consists of
attempts to divine why the House of Representatives rejected
the Sherman Amendment to the 1871 Civil Rights Act, which
would have imposed liability on a municipality for acts of
private parties occurring within its borders.23 These attempts
at divination have caused much mischief. They led to the
Court's holding of municipal immunity in Monroe,24 and, once
that was corrected, to the Court's ill-advised policy requirement
in Monell,2 5 which has spawned over the past twenty years
18

471 U.S. 808 (1985).

'9Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. See also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 479-81 (1986) (describing the policy requirement as intending to distinguish the
municipality's acts from those of its employees); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y.
Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 787 (1992)
(discussing the reasons for adoption of the policy requirement, and noting that its
derivation is a "source of wonder").
20 See, e.g., Kramer & Sykes, supra note 11, at 257-61.
21 Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
22 Sec. 1, which later became 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 683-90. See also Kramer & Sykes, supra note 11, at
257-61 (discussing rejection of the Sherman Amendment). The Court also seeks to
determine legislative intent by looking at the state of non-civil rights law in 1871, and
assuming that absent a specific provision to the contrary, the 1871 Congress intended
to incorporate current law'into the statute. For critiques of this methodology see, e.g.,
Kramer & Sykes, supra note 11, at 264-66; Richard Matasar, Personal Immunities
Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's HistoricalAnalysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741
(1987).
4 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
25

436 U.S. at 694.
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what Justice Breyer called, with some understatement, "a
highly complex body of interpretive law."26
In short, the twin pillars of the Court's municipal
liability jurisprudence, the language of the statute and its
legislative history, provide little support for the rejection of
respondeat superior, and for the resulting policy requirement
by which the Court seeks to ensure that the municipality and
its employees do not collapse into one entity for liability
purposes. Nevertheless, the Court increasingly finds a state of
mind requirement for municipalities in the same questionable
language and history.2 7
The policy requirement in Monell focuses inquiry on the
"nature of the [governmental] decision and the process by
which it is made,"28 deflecting attention from the harm caused
by the actions of government. The focus on delineating "policy"
lays the groundwork for an unfortunate fixation on identifying
causal links to formal decision making by identifiable persons
(and that harms identifiable persons). This fixation carries
with it the potential to deflect from the complex ways in which
government subjects people to deprivations. In Owen v. City of
Independence,29 decided two years after Monell, the Court came
as close as it ever would to recognizing the municipality as a
thing apart from its agents, understandable on its own terms,
without analogy to malevolent individual actors. In Owen the
Court recognized that systemic governmental injuries often
"result . . . from the interactive behavior of several
governmental officials, each of whom may be acting in good
faith," ° and refused to impose a state of mind requirement for
municipal liability. When, however, the Court began to deal
with governmental inaction-failure to train, discipline or
supervise-the specter of respondeat superior, or "too much
26
27

Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Given the paucity of legislative history and the spare text, the Court,

despite its protestations to the contrary, (see, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
316 (1975)) has filled in the interpretive gaps by creating a complex body of common
law to interpret the statute. Modern Section 1983 jurisprudence therefore, when
articulating the policies animating the statute, considers factors like fairness to the
affected parties, cost allocation, federalism and the proper balance between official
discretion and official constraint. However, these factors tend to be presented as merely
additional gloss on text and legislative intent, and not surprisingly, they too seem to
increasingly demand proof of municipal state of mind. See, e.g., the discussion of
federalism in Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 414.
2" Kramer & Sykes, supra note 11, at 252.
29 445 U.S.
622 (1980).
30 Id. at 652.
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liability," once again propelled it to define wrongdoing in terms
of deliberate choice of action by identifiable persons." The
Court was determined that liability should lie "only where the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at
issue." 2 The Court in City of Canton v. Harris limited liability
in such cases to deprivations flowing from "a deliberate or
conscious choice ... by [city policymakers.]"33 In Bryan County,
the Court then upped the ante with what was essentially a
malice aforethought requirement: that the policymaking official
"consciously disregarded an obvious risk that the officer would
subsequently inflict a particular constitutional injury. "34
Returning to the Area Two torture ring, it becomes
obvious that several layers of municipal government, including
the Chicago Police Department itself, are exempt from liability
under the Canton, Bryan County standard. As Judge Posner
saw the problem, (even at a time when Canton controlled,
before Bryan County tightened the standard), municipal
liability would lie only if the police chief had actually condoned
the activities, for example by telling "the office of investigations
to pay no attention to them."35 "Proof of dereliction of duty was
not enough. But that was all there was."36 In the Area Two
situation, as is often the case,37 every incentive was skewed in
favor of not knowing-not investigating, not gathering
information, not sharing information, not acknowledging the
receipt of information-suppressing information. 38 Deliberate
31 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392; Bryan County, 520 U.S.
at

410.

32 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 (citations omitted).
33 Id.

at 389.

34 520 U.S. at 411.

35 Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir. 1993).
31 Id.

at 1241.

31 See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES
FOR

OFFICIAL WRONGS 71-73 (1983) (describing skewed incentives toward inaction);
JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
USE OF FORCE 203-04 (1993) (describing the decision by some police departments not to
adopt specific policies in order to avoid liability); Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt,
Daniels and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random,
UnauthorizedAct, 72 IOWA L. REV. 101, 120-27 (1986).
38 To highlight a few examples, failure to collect and organize data enabled
the defendants to deny the existence of or knowledge of a pattern of torture. It enabled
the internal investigating agency to refuse to investigate, and then, when it finally did
-investigate, it enabled the police chief to call its report "statistically flawed." See
Charles Nicodemus, Brutality Rap Hits Merit Cop, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at 3.
Failing to collect and organize data then enabled the police department's general
counsel, when confronted with long-suppressed evidence of the department's knowledge
and acquiescence, to declare the case closed because it was "too old." See Bandes, supra
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indifference to a known risk was hardly necessary-mere
indifference, coupled with refusal to learn about the risks
involved, was sufficient to insulate every actor but those who
wielded a cattle prod. Certainly it was enough to insulate the
police chief, the designated policymaker under Monell and
Praprotnick," from knowledge of the day-to-day actions of his
low-level employees." As Peter Schuck so well described, we
rely on government officials to take affirmative action when
appropriate, yet they face incentives heavily skewed toward
inaction.4' Current municipal liability doctrine creates even
stronger incentives toward not knowing, not deliberating and,
ultimately, not acting.

III.

BUT DID THE GOVERNMENT REALLY

Do IT?

The Court's direction, in short, is toward requiring
blameworthy behavior by municipalities, while simultaneously
rejecting the idea that these entities are capable of engaging in
such behavior, or at least creating formidable hurdles to
proving its existence." My argument is not that this move is
doctrinally indefensible, but rather that it bespeaks a shift
from doctrine to attitude, or from formal notions of
responsibility to emotive notions,43 and that this shift goes
unacknowledged. Two conceptions of liability are at war here,
and only one is articulated. Wrongdoing, in the legal context,
and more specifically in the municipal liability context, is a
legal term that identifies behavior that ought to lead to
liability. It marks deviation from an agreed upon, socially
created standard of conduct.44 The notion of wrongdoing that
has increasingly misinformed municipal liability law is a
highly personal expression of the wrongdoer's attitudes or
note 1, at 1292-1303.
3' City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
40 Barbara Kritchevsky, A Return to Owen: Depersonalizing Section 1983
Municipal Liability Litigation, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1381, 1410 (1996) (arguing that narrow
standards for determining who is a policymaker are likely to identify only persons who
are so insulated from the day-to-day actions of municipal employees that they are
unlikely to know of specific misconduct (and therefore to possess the level of knowledge
required for deliberate indifference)).
'I SCHUCK, supra note 37, at ch. 3.
42 See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)
(holding that ordinarily municipal entities cannot be subjectively malicious); see also
Kritchevsky, supra note 40, at 1396 (discussing City of Newport).
43 Thanks to Robert Schapiro for helping me articulate these ideas.
44 See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, ConstitutionalDamages and Corrective
Justice:
A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997, 1009 (1990).
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emotions toward the victim. It locates wrongfulness in
malevolent desire or disposition; thus, it is a judgment of
private features of the self, rather than of professional violation
of shared, externalized norms."
In his wonderful book, Three Seductive Ideas,
psychologist Jerome Kagan warns against using "insufficiently
constrained"4 6 concepts that appear to describe psychological
processes. He says the following:
Trouble arises .. . when psychologists, sociologists, economists, and
others in the social and behavioral sciences use abstract words for
hidden psychological processes. Often, these words fail to specify
critical information such as the type of agent, the situation in which
4
7
the agent is acting, and the source of evidence for the ascription.

The problem Kagan describes is not, of course, confined to
description of psychological processes. Any abstract concept
runs a high risk of being insufficiently constrained, of failing to
specify critical information that would limit its uses across
disparate contexts. As linguist Ray Jackendoff noted, some
words for abstract objects present themselves as referring to
things "in the world," despite the fact that they represent not
concrete entities but a bundle of inferential features.4 " Unless
we "tune" our conceptualizations, as Jackendoff puts it, 9
constantly checking to see whether they converge, we are likely
to be using identical signifiers for entirely disparate sets of
inferences. The legal realm is rife with such abstract concepts.
Fred Schauer explains that certain concepts are "pervasively
indeterminate," in the sense that they cannot be applied to
specific cases without the addition of supplementary
premises.' °

" See also Judith Shulevitz, There's Something Wrong With Evil, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2002, at 39 (reviewing SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT: AN
ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (2002)). Shulevitz argues against thinking of
evil as based on intensity or content of beliefs, since such beliefs might be strongly held
and sincere, yet still lead to terrible wrongs. She suggests defining evil by the acts

performed and by whether they violate standards of behavior.
46 JEROME KAGAN, THREE SEDUCTIVE IDEAS 77

(1998).
Id. at 13.
"' RAY JACKENDOFF, FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 323 (2002). Thanks to
17

Larry Solan for introducing me to these materials.
'9 Id.
at 332.
50 Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 514 (1988). See also
Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 866

(2001).
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In the context of municipal liability, the abstract charge
of "wrongdoing" is leveled against the abstract entity
"government." Determining when such wrongdoing had
occurred was never easy, but the determination became
increasingly unconstrained, even unmoored, as the Court
shifted from viewing the government entity as a construct
whose goals should be judged against norms of governmental
behavior, to viewing it as a concrete object in the world. It
began using the language of human behavior, not as a useful
heuristic, but as a description of what really exists.5
The early post-Monell case of City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc." is a good example of the curious mix these
opinions contain. The Court, rejecting the imposition of
punitive damages against municipalities, rested its analysis in
part on its view of the purposes behind Section 1983 and on its
view of the optimal allocation of the costs of government
wrongdoing.53 It also veered into descriptive assertions of "what
really is:" statements about municipalities as if they are "in the
world" and have identifiable attributes. 4 The Court opined that
punishment, through the imposition of punitive damages,
should be applied not to the entity, but only to the actual
wrongdoer." It found that a government official can act
knowingly, willfully and maliciously, but a municipality
cannot. 6 The Court concluded that it makes no sense,
therefore, to assess punitive damages against the municipality
and that, moreover, such an award would act as retribution
against blameless and innocent taxpayers. 7
In more recent cases, continuing to use the language of
descriptive accuracy, the Court created the double bind of
requiring the very mental states of which it earlier pronounced
the entity incapable. In Canton it imposed a deliberate
indifference standard to ensure that liability is fixed only
51
52
53
54
55

See Edward Rubin, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1997).
453 U.S. 247 (1980).
Id. at 266-71.
See, e.g., id. at 267.
Id.

56 Id. Here the Court quoted what it calls the "rationale" of an 1882 state
court case: "[Tihe city is not a spoliator and should not be visited by vindictive or
punitive damages." Id. at 262 (citing Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323, 350
(1882)).
57 City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 266 (citing
McGary v. President & Council of
the City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668, 674 (La. 1846)). Here the Court cited language from
a pre-1871 state court case explaining that such damages would be "borne by widows,
orphans, aged men and women, and strangers." Id.
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"where the municipality itself causes the constitutional
violation at issue."" In Bryan County, it spoke of limiting
liability to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible59 and avoiding the risk of holding it responsible for
an injury that it did not cause. 6°
Notice that the language becomes not only emotive, but
morally tinged. This shift marks the unannounced and
undefended move from responsibility to blame, in the sense
that "blame is a word we reserve for humans who are both
responsible and morally responsible in an unpleasant way." 61 It
suggests that it would not be fair or right to blame the entity
for something it did not do. It is not hard to understand the
urge to thus moralize and personify. It is difficult to tell a
compelling and coherent story about a complex entity, so the
storyteller borrows metaphors, and often does so sloppily. In
our stories, we tend to want people with whom we can identify
and people we can judge. We want someone to blame and
someone to root for. We want evil to have, as Andrew Delbanco
put it, "a name, a face, and an explanation."62 If someone does
wrong, we want it to be the result of a choice to act by someone
capable of reasoning. We want a motive. We want simple
causal links between actor and act, between wrongdoing and
consequence.
The drive for coherent and affecting narrative can be
understood through many lenses. We can look to narrative
theory, beginning with Vladimir Propp's taxonomy of the
common structures of all folktales.63 We can look to cognitive
theory's treatment of the powerful pull of metaphor, a field that
Steven Winter has explicitly linked to this area of law.64 And
we can look to the development of the legal system, from
primitive notions of retribution and revenge for the
blameworthy person with evil design, toward a more
58 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 378 (1989).
59 Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997).

Id.
John Darley, Incommensurability and Symbolism in Civil Sanctioning,
Remarks at Responsibility & Blame: Psychological & Legal Perspectives, Symposium
at Brooklyn Law School (Oct. 18, 2002).
62 ANDREW DELBANCO, THE DEATH OF SATAN: How AMERICANS HAVE
LOST
60
61

THE SENSE OF EVIL 181 (1995). See also Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and
the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 903
(2000) (citing and discussing Delbanco's book).
VLADIMIR PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLKTALE (Lawrence Scott trans.,
2d ed. 1990) (1928).
Winter, supra note 10.
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enlightened and forward-looking"5 focus on protection of the
public interest. Indeed, the Owen Court, more than twenty
years ago, approvingly noted that the evolution of tort law from
a focus on individual blameworthiness to a principle of
equitable loss-spreading harmonized well with the goals of
Section

1983.66

Yet

the

drive

toward

humanizing

and

emotionalizing is deeply rooted. 7
The move toward the emotive is understandable, but in
this context it is highly problematic. As Jerome Kagan notes,
"all words for cognitive, emotional and behavioral processes are
functional categories .... ,,"To employ abstract notions like

malice, blame or conscious choice is to risk uncritically
importing assumptions from one category to another. Or, to put
it another way, it is to reach for a highly available prototype
though it is poorly tailored to the situation at hand. 9 Social
psychologists have found that individual judgments about
responsibility tend to be closely linked to the defendant's
intentions, knowledge and proximity. This linkage creates
difficulties when neither the bureaucratic decision-making
process nor the criteria for liability fit within the individual,
fault-based template. °
Recalling Area Two, we understand what it means to
blame Commander John Burge for torturing helpless suspects;
this resonates with most every pre-existing set of beliefs about
evil human behavior. When the concept is imported to the
category of bureaucratic failure to act, however, those
resonances remain, though the functional category has changed
dramatically. The question is now whether a public official,
such as a police chief or even a mayor, has abused his authority
in a way that led to the deprivation of constitutional rights. In
this context, the resonances serve mainly to mislead. We will
not hear stories about the police chief or the mayor that fit the
script, or satisfy the basic urge to punish evildoers, who acted

" See Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319,
320 (1996) (discussing the difference between backward-looking norms of culpability
and forward-looking norms of wrongdoing).
66 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
67 See HANS, supra note 4, at 90-91 (noting jury tendencies to invoke
individual templates and search for appropriate human analogies).
KAGAN, supra note 46, at 80.
See Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of
Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 857, 859 (1991).
70 HANS, supra note 4,
at 93.
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consciously and alone and caused easily traceable harm.7 ' As
Justice White observed in the context of a challenge to
inhumane prison conditions, they "often are the result of
cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials . . .
sometimes over a long period of time. In those circumstances, it
is far from clear whose intent should be examined. Intent
simply is not very meaningful when considering a challenge to
an institution . ,,72 Indeed, the intent standard is worse than
"not very meaningful" in this context. Intent and deliberate
indifference standards exacerbate the incentive structure that
exists in most bureaucratic institutions: They put a premium
on delegating, not knowing, not acting, not making a paper
trail. They insulate acts, or failures to act, that flow from the
conflicting and multiple motives, goals and agendas that most
collectives, and most individuals, possess. They insulate acts
that flow from unconscious racism,73 from "external" problems
like lack of funding74 and even from bureaucrats doing the best
they can, though it is inadequate to prevent serious
constitutional harm.
The problem of misdescription is not a function solely of
the seductive pull of blame. Municipal liability jurisprudence
relies on other misleading models as well; it draws from tort
models that erase the difference between private wrongs and
constitutional harm,7 from economic models that conflate
corporate with governmental bureaucracies," even from
interest group theories that fail to distinguish top-level
politicians from street-level bureaucrats. There is far too little
nuanced information on the ways in which governmental
entities make decisions, and the sorts of incentives, legal or
otherwise, that would best promote accountability."
Thus, the misuse of the concept of blame is not the sole
culprit in skewing municipal liability doctrine. Conversely, I
am not arguing that the concept of blame ought to be banished
" Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2271, 2320-23 (1990); Bandes, supra note 1, at 1328-38.
72 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310 (1991).
73 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
74 Kritchevsky, supra note 40, at 1433.
75 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 71, at 2320-23; Nahmod, supra note 44.
76 Rubin, supra note 51, at 1438.
77 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets,
Politics,
and the Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
78 See, e.g., id. at 353-54.
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from municipal liability jurisprudence. It should, however, be
approached as a functional concept with a particular purpose."
Peter French, who writes about corporate intent and integrity,
has argued that it does make sense to ascribe moral virtue to
corporations." He suggests, in an article written several years
before the Enron scandal and related revelations, that we
acknowledge that "there are distinctly corporate plans and
policies that provide the reasons why corporations do the
things they do," and that these need not be reduced to
statements about the plans "of humans who happen to be
agents of the corporate actor."8' Once we focus on their unique
structure, we see that corporations can be structured to pursue
integrity, or not." The fascinating recent obstruction of justice
trial of Arthur Andersen suggests the contortions juries go
through when attempting to force systemic misconduct into an
individual model." They tend to search for the wrongdoing
actor, even the scapegoat."
Concerns about the moral integrity of bureaucracies
take on particular urgency when the bureaucracies are
governmental. Government in particular, the "omnipresent
teacher,"8 is a moral agent. Justice Brennan stated so
eloquently in Owen:
How "uniquely amiss" it would be ... if the government itself-"the
social organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of
liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy
norms and goals for social conduct"-were permitted to disavow
liability for the injury it has begotten.8s
79 See generally my introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW
(Susan A. Bandes
ed., 1999) for discussion of the problems with decontextualized treatment of the role of
emotions in legal contexts.
80 Peter A. French, Integrity, Intentions, and Corporations,
34 AM. Bus. L.J.
141 (1996).
81 Id. at 152.
82 Id. at 152-55.

See, e.g., Dan Ackman, Andersen Jury's Philosophical Pickle, at
http://www.forbes.com/2002/06/14/0614topnews.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
84 By the same token, a recent book on corporate crime points out
that the
FBI's Uniform Reporting Program, which determines the "nation's crime index," does
not report crime by corporations, even when the corporations are convicted of felonies.
See THOM HARTMAN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND
THE THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 184 (2002). See also Mark Fishman, Crime Waves as
Ideology, in JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA 159, 172 (Ray Surette ed., 1984) (pointing out that
police blotters do not report white collar crime).
85 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
86 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
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Municipalities are capable of wrongful and even reprehensible
acts, and when they engage in such acts, it is important to
place the responsibility, and indeed the stigma, where it
belongs. To do so holds the entity responsible for the public
meaning of its actions, affirms the importance of the rights at
stake and puts the moral onus where it belongs 5 -upon those
who collectively failed to avoid abusing the public trust.

87

See Levinson, supra note 77, at 408 (singling out the government official

closest to the harm will be arbitrary from a moral point of view if that officer is merely
responding to bureaucratic incentives or carrying through the inevitable results of lack
of training or resources.) Of course, the individual official may be liable in his
individual capacity, and this should be true whether or not municipal liability lies. See
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (finding by jury that police officer
inflicted no constitutional injury on plaintiff removed any basis for liability against the
city); but see Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining
Responsibility in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
417, 454-59 (1992) (arguing that Heller should not mean that exoneration of individual
defendants precludes municipal liability).

